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Abstract
We examine the marriage of recent probabilistic generative models
for social networks with classical frameworks from mathematical eco-
nomics. We are particularly interested in how the statistical structure of
such networks influences global economic quantities such as price vari-
ation. Our findings are a mixture of formal analysis, simulation, and
experiments on an international trade data set from the United Nations.
1 Introduction
There is a long history of research in economics on mathematical models for exchange mar-
kets, and the existence and properties of their equilibria. The work of Arrow and Debreu
[1954], who established equilibrium existence in a very general commodities exchange
model, was certainly one of the high points of this continuing line of inquiry. The origins
of the field go back at least to Fisher [1891].
While there has been relatively recent interest in network models for interaction in eco-
nomics (see Jackson [2003] for a good review), it was only quite recently that a network or
graph-theoretic model that generalizes the classical Arrow-Debreu and Fisher models was
introduced (Kakade et al. [2004]). In this model, the edges in a network over individual
consumers (for example) represent those pairs of consumers that can engage in direct trade.
As such, the model captures the many real-world settings that can give rise to limitations on
the trading partners of individuals (regulatory restrictions, social connections, embargoes,
and so on). In addition, variations in the price of a good can arise due to the topology of
the network: certain individuals may be relatively favored or cursed by their position in the
graph.
In a parallel development over the last decade or so, there has been an explosion of interest
in what is broadly called social network theory — the study of apparently “universal”
properties of natural networks (such as small diameter, local clustering of edges, and heavy-
tailed distribution of degree), and statistical generative models that explain such properties.
When viewed as economic networks, the assumptions of individual rationality in these
works are usually either non-existent, or quite weak, compared to the Arrow-Debreu or
Fisher models.
In this paper we examine classical economic exchange models in the modern light of social
network theory. We are particularly interested in the interaction between the statistical
structure of the underlying network and the variation in prices at equilibrium. We quantify
the intuition that increased levels of connectivity in the network result in the equalization of
prices, and establish that certain generative models (such as the the preferential attachment
model of network formation (Barabasi and Albert [1999]) are capable of explaining the
heavy-tailed distribution of wealth first observed by Pareto. Closely related work to ours is
that of Kranton and Minehart [2001], which also considers networks of buyers and sellers,
though they focus more on the economics of network formation.
Many of our results are based on a powerful new local approximation method for global
equilibrium prices: we show that in the preferential attachment model, prices computed
from only local regions of a network yield strikingly good estimates of the global prices.
We exploit this method theoretically and computationally. Our study concludes with an
application of our model to United Nations international trade data.
2 Market Economies on Networks
We first describe the standard Fisher model, which consists of a set of consumers and a set
of goods. We assume that there are gj units of good j in the market, and that each good j is
be sold at some price pj . Each consumer i has a cash endowment ei, to be used to purchase
goods in a manner that maximizes the consumers’ utility. In this paper we make the well-
studied assumption that the utility function of each consumer is linear in the amount of
goods consumed (see Gale [1960]), and leave the more general case to future research. Let
uij ≥ 0 denote the utility derived by i on obtaining a single unit of good j. If i consumes
xij amount of good j, then the utility i derives is
∑
j uijxij .
A set of prices {pj} and consumption plans {xij} constitutes an equilibrium if the follow-
ing two conditions hold:
1. The market clears, i.e. supply equals demand. More formally, for each j,
∑
i xij = gj .
2. For each consumer i, their consumption plan {xij}j is optimal. By this we mean that
the consumption plan maximizes the linear utility function of i, subject to the constraint
that the total cost of the goods purchased by i is not more than the endowment ei.
It turns out that such an equilibrium always exists if each good j has a consumer which
derives nonzero utility for good j — that is, uij > 0 for some i (see Gale [1960]). Further-
more, the equilibrium prices are unique.
We now consider the graphical Fisher model, so named because of the introduction of a
graph-theoretic or network structure to exchange. In the basic Fisher model, we implicitly
assume that all goods are available in a centralized exchange, and all consumers have equal
access to these goods. In the graphical Fisher model, we desire to capture the fact that each
good may have multiple vendors or sellers, and that individual buyers may have access
only to some, but not all, of these sellers. There are innumerable settings where such asym-
metries arise. Examples include the fact that consumers generally purchase their groceries
from local markets, that social connections play a major role in business transactions, and
that securities regulations prevent certain pairs of parties from engaging in stock trades.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each seller j sells only one of the available
goods. (Each good may have multiple competing sellers.) Let G be a bipartite graph,
where buyers and sellers are represented as vertices, and all edges are between a buyer-
seller pair. The semantics of the graph are as follows: if there is an edge from buyer i to
seller j, then buyer i is permitted to purchase from seller j. Note that if buyer i is connected
to two sellers of the same good, he will always choose to purchase from the cheaper source,
since his utility is identical for both sellers (they sell the same good).
The graphical Fisher model is a special case of a more general and recently introduced
framework (Kakade et al. [2004]). One of the most interesting features of this model is the
fact that at equilibrium, significant price variations can appear solely due to structural prop-
erties of the underlying network. We now describe some generative models of economies.
3 Generative Models for Social Networks
For simplicity, in the sequel we will consider economies in which the numbers of buyers
and sellers are equal. We will also restrict attention to the case in which all sellers sell the
same good1.
The simplest generative model for the bipartite graph G might be the random graph, in
which each edge between a buyer i and a seller j is included independently with probability
p. This is simply the bipartite version of the classical Erdos-Renyi model (Bollobas [2001]).
Many researchers have sought more realistic models of social network formation, in order
to explain observed phenomena such as heavy-tailed degree distributions. We now describe
a slight variant of the preferential attachment model (see Mitzenmacher [2003]) for the case
of a bipartite graph. We start with a graph in which one buyer is connected to one seller. At
each time step, we add one buyer and one seller as follows. With probability α, the buyer
is connected to a seller in the existing graph uniformly at random; and with probability
1 − α, the buyer is connected to a seller chosen in proportion to the degree of the seller
(preferential attachment). Simultaneously, a seller is attached in a symmetric manner: with
probability α the seller is connected to a buyer chosen uniformly at random, and with
probability 1−α the seller is connected under preferential attachment. The parameter α in
this model thus allows us to move between a pure preferential attachment model (α = 0),
and a model closer to classical random graph theory (α = 1), in which new parties are
connected to random extant parties2.
Note that the above model always produces trees, since the degree of a new party is always
1 upon its introduction to the graph. We thus will also consider a variant of this model in
which at each time step, a new seller is still attached to exactly one extant buyer, while
each new buyer is connected to ν > 1 extant sellers. The procedure for edge selection is as
outlined above, with the modification that the ν new edges of the buyer are added without
replacement — meaning that we resample so that each buyer gets attached to exactly ν
distinct sellers. In a forthcoming long version, we provide results on the statistics of these
networks.
The main purpose of the introduction of ν is to have a model capable of generating highly
cyclical (non-tree) networks, while having just a single parameter that can “tune” the asym-
metry between the (number of) opportunities for buyers and sellers. There are also eco-
nomic motivations: it is natural to imagine that new sellers of the good arise only upon
obtaining their first customer, but that new buyers arrive already aware of several alterna-
tive sellers.
In the sequel, we shall refer to the generative model just described as the bipartite (α, ν)-
model. We will use n to denote the number of buyers and the number of sellers, so the
network has 2n vertices. Figure 1 and its caption provide an example of a network gener-
ated by this model, along with a discussion of its equilibrium properties.
4 Economics of the Network: Theory
We now summarize our theoretical findings. The proofs will be provided in a forthcoming
long version. We first present a rather intuitive “frontier” theorem, which implies a scheme
in which we can find upper and lower bounds on the equilibrium prices using only local
computations. To state the theorem we require some definitions. First, note that any subset
V ′ of buyers and sellers defines a natural induced economy, where the induced graph G′
1From a mathematical and computational standpoint, this restriction is rather weak: when con-
sidered in the graphical setting, it already contains the setting of multiple goods with binary utility
values, since additional goods can be encoded in the network structure.
2We note that α = 1 still does not exactly produce the Erdos-Renyi model due to the incremental
nature of the network generation: early buyers and sellers are still more likely to have higher degree.
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Figure 1: Sample network generated by the bipartite (α = 0, ν = 2)-model. Buyers and sellers
are labeled by ‘B’ or ‘S’ respectively, followed by an index indicating the time step at which they
were introduced to the network. The solid edges in the figure show the exchange subgraph — those
pairs of buyers and sellers who actually exchange currency and goods at equilibrium. The dotted
edges are edges of the network that are unused at equilibrium because they represent inferior prices
for the buyers, while the dashed edges are edges of the network that have competitive prices, but are
unused at equilibrium due to the specific consumption plan required for market clearance. Each seller
is labeled with the price they charge at equilibrium. The example exhibits non-trivial price variation
(from 2.00 down to 0.33 per unit good). Note that while there appears to be a correlation between
seller degree and price, it is far from a deterministic relation, a topic we shall examine later.
consists of all edges between buyers and sellers in V ′ that are also in G. We say that G′
has a buyer (respectively, seller) frontier if on every (simple) path in G from a node in V ′
to a node outside of V ′, the last node in V ′ on this path is a buyer (respectively, seller).
Theorem 1 (Frontier Bound) If V ′ has a subgraph G′ with a seller (respectively, buyer)
frontier, then the equilibrium price of any good j in the induced economy on V ′ is a lower
bound (respectively, upper bound) on the equilibrium price of j in G.
Theorem 1 implies a simple price upper bound: the price commanded by any seller j is
bounded by its degree d. Although the same upper bound can be seen from first principles,
it is instructive to apply Theorem 1. Let G′ be the immediate neighborhood of j (which is j
and its d buyers); then the equilibrium price in G′ is just d, since all d buyers are forced to
buy from seller j. This provides an upper bound since G′ has a buyer frontier. Since it can
be shown that the degree distribution obeys a power law in the bipartite (α, ν)-model, we
have an upper bound on the cumulative price distribution. We use β = (1− α)ν/(1 + ν).
Theorem 2 In the bipartite (α, ν)-model, the proportion of sellers with price greater than
w is O(w−1/β). For example, if α = 0 (pure preferential attachment) and ν = 1, the
proportion falls off as 1/w2.
We do not yet have such a closed-form lower bound on the cumulative price distribution.
However, as we shall see in Section 5, the price distributions seen in large simulation results
do indeed show power-law behavior. Interestingly, this occurs despite the fact that degree
is a poor predictor of individual seller price.
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Figure 2: See text for descriptions.
Another quantity of interest is what we might call price variation — the ratio of the price
of the richest seller to the poorest seller. The following theorem addresses this.
Theorem 3 In the bipartite (α, ν)-model, if α(ν2 + 1) < 1, then the ratio of the maximum
price to the minimum price scales with number of buyers n as Ω(n 2−α(ν
2+1)
1+ν ). For the
simplest case in which α = 0 and ν = 1, this lower bound is just Ω(n).
We conclude our theoretical results with a remark on the price variation in the Erdos-Renyi
(random graph) model. First, let us present a condition for there to be no price variation.
Theorem 4 A necessary and sufficient condition for there to be no price variation, ie for
all prices to be equal to 1, is that for all sets of vertices S, |N(S)| ≥ |S|, where N(S) is
the set of vertices connected by an edge to some vertex in S.
This can be viewed as an extremely weak version of standard expansion properties well-
studied in graph theory and theoretical computer science — rather than demanding that
neighbor sets be strictly larger, we simply ask that they not be smaller. One can further show
that for large n, the probability that a random graph (for any edge probability p > 0) obeys
this weak expansion property approaches 1. In other words, in the Erdos-Renyi model,
there is no variation in price — a stark contrast to the preferential attachment results.
5 Economics of the Network: Simulations
We now present a number of studies on simulated networks (generated according to the
bipartite (α, ν)-model). Equilibrium computations were done using the algorithm of Deva-
nur et al. [2002] (or via the application of this algorithm to local subgraphs). We note that
it was only the recent development of this algorithm and related ones that made possible
the simulations described here (involving hundreds of buyers and sellers in highly cyclical
graphs). However, even the speed of this algorithm limits our experiments to networks with
n = 250 if we wish to run repeated trials to reduce variance. Many of our results suggest
that the local approximation schemes discussed below may be far more effective.
Price and Degree Distributions: The first (leftmost) panel of Figure 2 shows empirical
cumulative price and degree distributions on a loglog scale, averaged over 25 networks
drawn according to the bipartite (α = 0.4, ν = 1)-model with n = 250. The cumulative
degree distribution is shown as a dotted line, where the y-axis represents the fraction of
the sellers with degree greater than or equal to d, and the degree d is plotted on the x-axis.
Similarly, the solid curve plots the fraction of sellers with price greater than some value w,
where the price w is shown on the x-axis. The thin sold line has our theoretically predicted
slope of −1β = −3.33, which shows that degree distribution is quite consistent with our
expectations, at least in the tails. Though a natural conjecture from the plots is that the
price of a seller is essentially determined by its degree, below we will see that the degree
is a rather poor predictor of an individual seller price, while more complex (but still local)
properties are extremely accurate predictors.
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that the tail of the price distribution looks linear, i.e.
it also exhibits power law behavior. Our theory provided an upper bound, which is precisely
the cumulative degree distribution. We do not yet have a formal lower bound. This plot
(and other experiments we have done) further confirm the robustness of the power law
behavior in the tail, for α < 1 and ν = 1.
As discussed in the Introduction, Pareto’s original observation was that the wealth (which
corresponds to seller price in our model) distribution in societies obey a power law, which
has been born out in many studies on western economies. Since Pareto’s original observa-
tion, there have been too many explanations of this phenomena to recount here. However,
to our knowledge, all of these explanations are more dynamic in nature (eg a dynamical
system of wealth exchange) and don’t capture microscopic properties of individual ratio-
nality. Here we have power law wealth distribution arising from the combination of certain
natural statistical properties of the network, and classical theories of economic equilibrium.
Bounds via Local Computations: Recall that Theorem 1 suggests a scheme by which we
can do only local computations to approximate the global equilibrium price for any seller.
More precisely, for some seller j, consider the subgraph which contains all nodes that are
within distance k of j. In our bipartite setting, for k odd, this subgraph has a buyer frontier,
and for k even, this subgraph has a seller frontier, since we start from a seller. Hence,
the equilibrium computation on the odd k (respectively, even k) subgraph will provide an
upper (respectively, lower) bound.
This provides an heuristic in which one can examine the equilibrium properties of small
regions of the graph, without having to do expensive global equilibrium computations.
The effectiveness of this heuristic will of course depend on how fast the upper and lower
bounds tighten. In general, it is possible to create specific graphs in which these bounds
are arbitrarily poor until k is large enough to encompass the entire graph. As we shall see,
the performance of this heuristic is dramatically better in the bipartite (α, ν)-model.
The second panel in Figure 2 shows how rapidly the local equilibrium computations con-
verge to the true global equilibrium prices as a function of k, and also how this conver-
gence is influenced by n. In these experiments, graphs were generated by the bipartite
(α = 0, ν = 1) model. The value of n is given on the x-axis; the average errors (over
5 trials for each value of k and n) in the local equilibrium computations are given on the
y-axis; and there is a separate plot for each of 4 values for k. It appears that for each value
of k, the quality of approximation obtained has either mild or no dependence on n.
Furthermore, the regular spacing of the four plots on the logarithmic scaling of the y-axis
establishes the fact that the error of the local approximations is decaying exponentially
with increased k — indeed, by examining only neighborhoods of 3 steps from a seller in an
economy of hundreds, we are already able to compute approximations to global equilibrium
prices with errors in the second decimal place. Since the diameter for n = 250 was often
about 17, this local graph is considerably smaller than the global. However, for the crudest
approximation k = 1, which corresponds exactly to using seller degree as a proxy for
price, we can see that this performs rather poorly. Computationally, we found that the time
required to do all 250 local computations for k = 3 was about 60% less than the global
computation, and would result in presumably greater savings at much larger values of n.
Parameter Dependencies: We now provide a brief examination of how price variation
depends on the parameters of the bipartite (α, ν)-model. We first experimentally evaluate
the lower bounds provided in Theorem 3. The third panel of Figure 2 shows the maximum
to minimum price as function of n (averaged over 25 trials) on a loglog scale. Each line is
for a fixed value of ν, and the values of ν range form 1 to 4 (α = 0).
Recall from Theorem 3, our lower bound on the ratio is Ω(n
2
1+ν ) (using α = 0). We
conjecture that this is tight, and, if so, the slopes of lines (in the loglog plot) should
be 2
1+ν , which would be (1, 0.67, 0.5, 0.4). The estimated slopes are somewhat close:
(1.02, 0.71, 0.57, 0.53). The overall message is that for small values of ν, price variation
increases rapidly with the economy size n in preferential attachment.
The rightmost panel of Figure 2 is a scatter plot of α vs. the maximum to minimum price
in a graph (where n = 250) . Here, each point represents the maximum to minimum price
ratio in a specific network generated by our model. The circles are for economies generated
with ν = 1 and the x’s are for economies generated with ν = 3. Here we see that in general,
increasing α dramatically decreases price variation (note that the price ratio is plotted on a
log scale). This justifies the intuition that as α is increased, more “economic equality” is
introduced in the form of less preferential bias in the formation of new edges. Furthermore,
the data for ν = 1 shows much larger variation, suggesting that a larger value of ν also has
the effect of equalizing buyer opportunities and therefore prices.
6 An Experimental Illustration on International Trade Data
We conclude with a brief experiment exemplifying some of the ideas discussed
so far. The statistics division of the United Nations makes available exten-
sive data sets detailing the amounts of trade between major sovereign nations (see
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade). We used a data set indicating, for each pair of na-
tions, the total amount of trade in U.S. dollars between that pair in the year 2002.
For our purposes, we would like to extract a discrete network structure from this numerical
data. There are many reasonable ways this could be done; here we describe just one.
For each of the 70 largest nations (in terms of total trade), we include connections from
that nation to each of its top k trading partners, for some integer k > 1. We are thus
including the more “important” edges for each nation. Note that each nation will have
degree at least k, but as we shall see, some nations will have much higher degree, since
they frequently occur as a top k partner of other nations. To further cast this extracted
network into the bipartite setting we have been considering, we ran many trials in which
each nation is randomly assigned a role as either a buyer or seller (which are symmetric
roles), and then computed the equilibrium prices of the resulting network economy. We
have thus deliberately created an experiment in which the only economic asymmetries are
those determined by the undirected network structure.
The leftmost panel of Figure 3 show results for 1000 trials under the choice k = 3. The
upper plot shows the average equilibrium price for each nation, where the nations have been
sorted by this average price. We can immediately see that there is dramatic price variation
due to the network structure; while many nations suffer equilibrium prices well under $1,
the most topologically favored nations command prices of $4.42 (U.S.), $4.01 (Germany),
$3.67 (Italy), $3.16 (France), $2.27 (Japan), and $2.09 (Netherlands). The lower plot of the
leftmost panel shows a scatterplot of a nation’s degree (x-axis) and its average equilibrium
price (y-axis). We see that while there is generally a monotonic relationship, at smaller
degree values there can be significant price variation (on the order of $0.50).
The center panel of Figure 3 shows identical plots for the choice k = 10. As suggested
by the theory and simulations, increasing the overall connectivity of each party radically
reduces price variation, with the highest price being just $1.10 and the lowest just under $1.
Interestingly, the identities of the nations commanding the highest prices (in order, U.S.,
France, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands) overlaps significantly with the
k = 3 case, suggesting a certain robustness in the relative economic status predicted by
the model. The lower plot shows that the relationship between degree and price divides the
population into “have” (degree above 10) and “have not” (degree below 10) components.
The preponderance of European nations among the top prices suggests our final experi-
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Figure 3: See text for descriptions.
ment, in which we modified the k = 3 network by merging the 15 current members of the
European Union (E.U.) into a single economic nation. This merged vertex has much higher
degree than any of its original constituents and can be viewed as an (extremely) idealized
experiment in the economic power that might be wielded by a truly unified Europe.
The rightmost panel of Figure 3 provides the results, where we show the relative prices and
the degree-price scatterplot for the 35 largest nations. The top prices are now commanded
by the E.U. ($7.18), U.S. ($4.50), Japan ($2.96), Turkey ($1.32), and Singapore ($1.22).
The scatterplot shows a clear example in which the highest degree (held by the U.S.) does
not command the highest price.
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